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ABSTRACT 
42 fishstocks come within New Zealand's Quota Management System. 
The nature of the right in the harvest of the 42 commercially targeted 
species is vested in the fishing industry in the form of an entrenched 
property right. Industry commonly harvests fishstock using methods 
which have destructive and irreversible effects on the marine 
environment. 
Approximately 8, OOO marine species have been described so far in New 
Zealand waters. Non-commercial fishery stakeholders in the marine 
environment have an interest in the entirety of our marine biodiversity. 
The nature of their rights and interests is undefined Their interests are 
rendered secondary to those of the commercial fishing industry. 
This arrangement is unsatisfactory. Definitional problems relating to 
non-commercial fishing interests ought not to be used as an excuse to 
ignore those interests. Steps need to be taken urgently to address this 
imbalance of rights. Given the difficulties in defining rights to non-
commercial fishing interests, an alternative is to work towards better 
definition and enforcement of duties owed by industry to other 
stakeholders in the marine environment. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, and 
appendices) comprises approximately 13,210 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The ocean is home to an enormous amount of resources. New Zealand's 
exclusive economic zone is the fourth largest in the world. New 
Zealanders value the ocean and the resources within it for many reasons. 
These include direct use values such as maritime transport; oil, petroleum 
and mineral extraction; recreational swimming, diving and fishing; 
scientific uses including pharmacology and biotechnology; Maori 
customary usage; aquaculture and of course, commercial fishing. 
Indirect use value such as climate regulation and habitat are also 
recognised. Further, there are non-use values such as those of future 
generations, conservationists, as yet unknown scientific values and 
intrinsic value. 1 For all of these reasons there is a growing awareness of 
the need to conserve our marine environment. 
Needless to say conflicts arise between differing resource values and 
resource management regimes with respect to New Zealand's seas. 
The commercial fisheries user group operates within a quota 
management system (QMS) which confers on each fisher a "property 
right" in the harvest of commercially viable species. This regime is 
designed to provide for sustainable management of the fisheries resource 
specifically. 
This paper will explore the nature of the commercial fishers' "property 
right" in their harvest and how it interacts with the rights and interests of 
other user and non-user stakeholders in the marine environment. The 
importance of this comparison is that the exercise of the commercial 
fishers' property right impacts on the marine environment and the other 
stakeholders in it. 
For a detailed chart of the value of the marine environment, see appendix 1. 
Forty-two species of fish are subject to the QMS. These species form a 
very small part of the biodiversity of the marine environment as a whole. 
Other stakeholders in the marine environment are concerned with marine 
ecosystems in their entirety, including all marine flora and fauna, fish 
habitat, wildlife, biodiversity and genetic diversity. 
Legal obligations to protect the marine environment exist at international 
and domestic levels. This paper examines how New Zealand' s legislative 
regime does or does not give effect to the principles contained in these 
legal instruments. It concludes that although the relevant international 
obligations are addressed in the wording of the legislative regime, the 
"property rights" rationale underpinning it appears to be inconsistent with 
according comprehensive practical effect to these obligations. In 
particular the single-species focus of the property right fails to provide 
the intended incentive to conserve non-target components of the marine 
environment. This problem is exacerbated by a lack of political will to 
implement the relevant sustainability provisions coupled with the 
weakness of rights held by non-commercial fishery stakeholders. 
Part II of this paper outlines the factual background concerning fishing 
rights and marine ecosystems and their resources. Parts ID and IV 
respectively look at the international and domestic legal frameworks 
relevant to the marine environment. Part V looks at the implementation 
of these frameworks . Parts VI and VII explore the imbalance of rights 
under which various stakeholders in our marine environment operate. 
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II FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A Historic Development of Fishing Rights 
At common law there exists a "public right of fishing" which, with regard 
to tidal waters, dates back to the Magna Carta. 2 The effect of such a 
right is to encourage competition for a finite stock. This can be seen 
through the metaphor of the "tragedy of the commons"3 which describes 
the inevitable destruction of a limited resource where an expanding 
population has unlimited access to it and its use. The day-to-day race for 
stock means no time is reserved for husbandry or stock improvement and 
profit re-investment is limited to better harvest equipment which becomes 
over-capitalised for diminishing returns. 
The primary legal solutions to the commons scenario are:4 
(a) privatisation of common resources and / or 
(b) regulation of the resource by an external or collective authority. 
It has been argued that traditional and community-based management 
systems may also be a solution. 5 
When there is competition for a common stock, the choice of regulation 
is critical. Fisheries legislation has only occurred in the latter half of this 
century in most countries, and only within the last few decades in the 
international arena. 
2 
3 
4 
C McCamish "Fisheries Management Act 1991: Aie ITQs Property?" (1994) 
22 FLR 375, 377. 
G Hardin "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) 162 Science 1243. 
G Hardin "The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons" (1994) 9 Trends in 
Ecology & Evolution 199. 
B Pardy Environmental Law A Guide To Concepts (Butterworths Canada 1996) 
286. 
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B New Zealand's Changing Regime 
Inshore fisheries were about to reach their limit in the late 1970s when 
New Zealand established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) giving it 
exclusive control of the marine resources within 200 nautical miles of the 
coastline. Governments tried to protect stocks by restricting fishing gear, 
closing fishing areas, shortening fishing seasons, prescribing fishing 
technology and methods, allocating catches and resolving conflicts. 
6 
Fishing fleets expanded beyond the capacity needed to harvest the 
available catch. Stocks were depleting, fishermen's income declined and 
conflicts among fishing groups intensified. The weaknesses of the 
regulatory approach to managing fisheries became increasingly evident. 
The Fisheries Amendment Act 1986 amended the Fisheries Act 1983 (the 
1983 Act) and brought in the revolutionary Quota Management System 
(QMS) which moved fisheries management towards resource 
management through private property rights. The coastal fishing fleet 
was reduced by 40 per cent while investment by larger companies saw 
the deep-water fishery expand immensely. There is now a marked 
concentration of quota within the big companies. 7 
The EEZ has been divided into 10 Quota Management Areas (QMAs). 
Each year fishery scientists analyse catch and trawler survey data to 
assess whether each stock is above or below its Maximum Sustainable 
Yield (MSY) level. The MSY is the maximum tonnage that can be taken 
from a stock while still leaving a constant population of breeding 
individuals. From this information and consultation with interest groups, 
the Minister of Fisheries sets the annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC). 
6 P Pearse Building on Progress, Fisheries Policy Development in New Zealand 
(Report prepared for the Minister ofFisheries, July 1991) 5 [Pearse) . 
60 per cent of quota is owned by the three largest companies, Sealord, Sanford 
and Amaltal. See Ministry for the Environment The State of New Zealand's 
Environment (1997) 9.96 [The State of New Zealand's Environment] . 
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The objective in setting TACs is to hold stocks to their MSY level. The 
TAC specifies the total amount that may be taken from a stock by the 
combined efforts of commercial, recreational and Maori customary 
fishers. The recreational and Maori customary fishing component is 
estimated while the main portion of the TAC consists of the Total 
Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC). This is divided among 
commercial fishers in the fonn oflndividual Transferable Quota (ITQ). 
The QMS has been hailed an economic success, but was criticised for 
failing to provide for ecological considerations. An attempted answer to 
this criticism came with the passage of the Fisheries Act 1996 ( the 1996 
Act) which addresses the issues of sustainability of the target resource as 
well as other elements and species equally important to the ecosystem's 
survival.8 
C The Ecosystem of the Seafloor 
1 The state of New Zealand's marine ecosystems 
The diversity of New Zealand's marine species is very high, partly due to 
our geological history, and because our islands straddle major ocean 
currents which bring a wide variety of larvae from sub-tropical and polar 
sources. Approximately 8,000 marine species have been described so far 
in New Zealand waters, including 61 species of seabirds, 41 marine 
mammals, 964 fish (of which 108 are endemic), 2,000 molluscs (snails, 
shellfish and squid), 350 sponges, 400 echinodenns (various types of 
starfish), 900 species of seaweeds, and 700 species of micro-algae. 9 
8 
9 
See Fisheries Act 1996 parts II and III brought into force by Fisheries Act 
Commencement Order (No 2) 1996 SR 1996/255. 
Sustainable Use: Commercial Fisheries (draft only) last changes made 17 
December 1997, background paper to the Biodiversity Strategy 2 [Sustainable 
Use] . 
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Tall mountains called seamounts found in the deeper waters of our EEZ 
have rich ecosystems and many harbour their own unique endemic 
species including black corals and horny corals. 10 The seamounts are 
places of shelter or sustenance for a wide range of marine flora and 
fauna. They attract large congregations of fish which, in turn, attract 
other species to the surrounding waters, such as sperm whales and sea 
birds.11 
The biodiversity of New Zealand's seamounts and indeed other regional 
marine habitats is only just beginning to be understood. Oceanographers 
have sampled a total of 1 .4 - 2 square kilometres of New Zealand's four 
million square kilometre EEZ. MAF research ships have sampled a 
further 5,600 kilometres, but not all species were recorded in the 
trawls.12 The National Institute for Water and Atmospheric Research 
(NIWA) 1s undertaking a Marine Biodiversity and Systematics 
Programme. The objective of the programme is to use all the data 
available on species' presence/absences to ascertain the make-up of 
benthic assemblages13 and their characterising species, and then map their 
distributions. 14 Because the task incorporates the entire EEZ, the project 
is a very long term one, though NIWA hopes to have the first benthic 
map in draft form a year from now. 
2 An ecosystem service 
(a)Habitat 
Benthos is essential habitat for fish and an abundance of other marine 
flora and fauna species. It provides nurseries, feeding and spawning 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
The State of New Zealand's Environment, above n 7, 7.30. 
The State of New Zealand's Environment, above n 7, 7.30. 
Sustainable Use, above n 9, 22 . 
Benthos is the flora and fauna found at the bottom of a sea or lake, The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 8th ed (Clarendon Press 1990). 
E-mail from Dennis Gordon, Marine Biodiversity & Systematics, NIWA, 4 
August 1999. 
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grounds. 15 Reef health generally, including that of the oyster, is elevated 
by secondary metabolites continually released by the sponges and 
bryozoans to deter predation, overgrowth and infection.16 Put simply, an 
oyster population in an original functioning ecosystem will suffer lower 
mortalities during outbreaks of disease and infection than an oyster 
population which has developed on the seafloor where its original habitat 
has been destroyed following a number of dredging seasons. This is 
commonly termed the "insurance value" of a healthy eco-system. 
Ecosystems in their unaltered form serve as indicators of environmental 
health which help to fully understand the effects of human activities on 
the environment at all levels from global warming, to pollution, to 
impacts of fishing. 17 
(b )Biodiversity 
It is increasingly recognised that biodiversity must be maintained as far as 
possible. One Gulf of Maine species appears to have completely 
vanished in waters raked by scallop dredges - a marine worm whose 
unusually large nerve axion once made it a valuable subject for 
neurological research. An endemic sponge was recently discovered off 
the Kaikoura coast which was found to produce a cancer fighting 
substance. 18 There are numerous species of benthos unknown as yet to 
scientists, which are being lost as biodiversity diminishes. This has 
enormous ramifications not only as far as the stability of the ecosystem 
15 
16 
17 
18 
See Chris Battershill, Dennis Gordon and Edward Abraham "Benthos: A 
Datalogger of Marine Envirorunental Health" [Battershill] in Sea Views: Marine 
Ecosystem Management Obligations and Opportunities, Proceedings of the 
conference held in Wellington, l l-14th of February I 998 (eds Catherine 
Wallace, Barry Weeber and Sam Buchanan, ECO 1998) 78 [Sea Views]. 
Battershill, above n 15, 81 
An Australian study has noted that the seaweed canopy reduces damage to corals 
by decreasing exposure to high temperatUies and high UV light intensities, see 
AIMS Sargassum Canopy Decreases Coral Bleaching on Inshore Reefs 
<http:/ /www.airns.gov.au/pages/research/seaweed/seaweed%2Dcanopy0 I .html> 
(last accessed 26 July 1999). 
The State of New Zealand's Environment, above n 7, 9.33 . 
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goes, but as an opportunity cost for a resource lost given the increasing 
importance of maintaining biodiversity for the purpose of bioprospecting. 
3 Scientific I medicinal I f ood value 
Many claims have been made for the effectiveness of seaweed on human 
health. It has been suggested, amongst other things, that seaweeds have 
curative powers for tuberculosis, arthritis, colds and influenza and worm 
infestations. 19 
Varieties of algae are used in the textile industry, in a range of food 
products, cosmetics and laboratory applications and in agriculture and 
horticulture. 20 Artificial substitutes for seaweed gums lack many of the 
same properties of the real product. 21 
Seaweed as a staple item of diet has been used in Japan and China for 
centuries where seaweed consumption reached an average of 3.5kg per 
household in 1973.22 Use of seaweed as a food source is now more 
widespread and is being marketed as a health food in many W estem 
countries.23 About seven million tonnes of seaweed (wet weight) were 
produced world-wide in 1993 of which some 65 per cent was food-
d -24 gra e. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
J R Stein and C A Borden "Causative and beneficial algae in human disease 
conditions: a review" Phycologia 23 (1984) 485. 
For instance "Seagro" is a brown algae based fertiliser which is manufactured in 
New Zealand. 
Michael D Guiry (1997) Liquid Seaweed Extracts <http://seaweed.ucg.ie/ 
SeaweedUsesGeneral/E>..'tracts.html> (last accessed 26 July 1999). 
Michael D Guiry (1997) Human Food <http://seaweed.ucg.ie/ 
SeaweedUsesGeneral/HumanFood.html> (last accessed 26 July 1999). 
Maine Coast Sea Vegetables <http://www.seaveg.com> (last accessed 26 July 
1999). 
Michael D Guiry (1997) The Irish Seaweed Industry <http://seaweed.ucg.ie/ 
SeaweedUseslreland/IrishSeaweedlnd.html> (last accessed 26 July 1999). 
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D The Threats to Seajloor Ecosystems 
1 Land based and marine pollution and development 
The decline of brown algae and sea grass on New Zealand's coast has 
been attributed to sedimentation caused by coastal developments such as 
harbour and marina construction, channel dredging and stormwater 
run off 
25 
This paper acknowledges the scale of the threat that these 
activities pose to benthos, but focuses on the threat of commercial fishing 
methods and the management thereof. 
2 Commercial fishing methods 
( a) Sediment resusperision 
With trawling and dredging, an enormous amount of sediment gets re-
suspended into the water column, where it causes problems for marine 
animals that hunt with sight, photosynthesizing organisms that need light 
and filter-feeding creatures such as mussels, clams and oysters. When the 
sediments do settle, they cover many organisms.26 A 1992 New Zealand 
study of seabed trawling revealed that turbidity was killing scallop larvae, 
eliminating slow-growing deep-water coral, and destroying bryozoan 
beds that served as fish nurseries. 27 
(b )Physical impact 
Disturbance comes about primarily because of the towing of heavy gear 
by boats or ships along the seabed to catch shrimp, fish and scallops. 
Dredging and bottom trawling reduces the species on the sea floor by 
25 
26 
27 
The State of New Zealand's Environment, above n 7, 7.30. 
Dick Russell, Hitting Bottom - Destroying the Seajloor <http://www.igc.apc.org/ 
nrdc/nrdc/eamicus/97win/hil.html> (last accessed 26 July 1999) [Russell] . 
JB Jones "Environmental Impact of Trawling the Seabed: a review" (1992) 26 
New Zealand Journal of Marine Freshwater Research 59 [Jones] . 
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physically disturbing the bottom. Once destroyed, coral formations 
appear to need 200-400 years to fully recover. 28 Recovery of non-coral 
sea floor communities may take decades once trawling has stopped. 29 
The effects of these methods have been compared to a practice called 
chaining, in which a drag chain is stretched between two bulldozers to 
clear unwanted vegetation as quickly as possible. Trawlers scrape nearly 
six million square miles per year, the equivalent of half the world's 
continental shelves. 30 This area is up to 150 times larger than the area of 
the world's clearcut forest. 
In the mid-1980s many vessel owners began installing "rockhoppers", 
equipment much like automobile tires which allow nets to move right 
over any obstructions.31 These all-terrain-vehicles have enabled vessels 
to trawl, at significantly higher speeds, places where the bottom habitat 
had remained pristine because the area was too rocky, deep or remote for 
older equipment to access. Scallop dredges also dig down into the 
bottom, scraping gravel and sea life attached to it into their chain bags. 
Researchers estimate that prawn trawlers in Australia discard 3000 
tonnes of material, mostly crustaceans and echinoderms, for each 500 
tonnes of prawns.32 There is evidence that when orange roughy trawling 
began over the sea mounts, the trawls brought up considerable amounts 
of benthic life, but that this has subsequently declined.33 In Golden Bay, 
the survival rate of scallops was over 20 per cent over nine months in an 
area closed to trawling, but was only 0.8 per cent for an adjacent site 
open to trawling. 34 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
The State of New Zealand's Environment, above n 7, 7.30. 
Jones, above n 27, 59. See also appendix 2. 
Research by Dr Les Watling, Professor of Oceanography at the University of 
Maine published in December issue of Conservation Biology, <http://www.skali. 
com.my/journey/ewt/057/ewtl9990126_01.html> (last accessed 26 July 1999). 
Russell, above n 26. 
Sustainable Use, above n 9, 17. 
Jones, above n 27 cited in Sustainable Use above n 9 18. 
Sustainable Use above n 9, 17. 
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It would be good to develop low impact bottom trawls and to define 
critical habitat in which it might not be appropriate to use mobile gear. 35 
Further, gillnet gear which is set and not dragged, is able to target fish by 
size and to be selective for certain species is considered habitat fiiendly 
compared to towed gear. 36 The use of circle hooks, which has now 
decreased to the point where only small coastal vessels use them, has 
little direct impact on habitat. 
However New Zealand fishers are not generally regulated by such input 
controls. The main legal instruments with regard to input controls and 
gear restrictions are regulations made under section 89 of the Fisheries 
Act 1983.37 
( c) Overfishing 
The direct effect of overfishing is the collapse of the target stock. The 
ecosystem ramifications are far wider. Over exploitation can cause 
genetic changes in the exploited populations and alters ecological 
relationships with the species' predators, symbionts, competitors and 
prey_3s 
A recent study by an Auckland University marine scientist, Dr Russell 
Babcock, has found that the effects of fishing can destroy kelp beds. 39 
The study found that overfishing of snapper left kelp-grazing urchins 
with few natural predators. An explosion of kina meant kelp forests were 
rapidly destroyed. The study noted that since the Leigh reserve was 
established in 1978, the increase in kelp and algal growth had led to the 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
Ronald Smolowitz Bottom Tending GearUsed in New England <http://www. 
fishingnj .org/artsmolowitz.htm> (last accessed 26 July 1999) [Smolowitz] . 
Smolowitz, above n 35. 
See below part IV. 
Food and Agriculture Organisation Special: Biodiversity for Food and 
Agriculture <http://www.fao.org/sd/epdirect/epre0044.htm> (last accessed 8 
August 1999). 
"Fishing destroys kelp beds, study finds" The Dominion, Wellington, 17 June 
1999 20 ["Fishing destroys kelp beds"] . 
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increase of other reef fish and inhabitants by 58 per cent. The study 
concludes that fishing has decreased the productivity of reefs on the east 
coast by between 40 and 50 per cent. 40 
(d) Dumping 
Dumping of processed waste or bycatch can potentially deplete oxygen 
levels on the seabed, but there are no studies on this impact in New 
Zealand.41 
III THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MARINE 
ECOSYSTEMS 
A Overview 
Numerous treaties, conventions, multilateral and bilateral agreements 
which are relevant to the marine environment exist within the broad 
categories of pollution, transportation and fisheries . 42 Some of these are 
binding and some are not. 43 International customary law largely consists 
of non-binding bilateral and multilateral treaties and conventions and the 
practice of states in the international community.44 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
"Fishing destroys kelp beds" above n 39. 
Sustainable Use, above n 9, 17. 
This section draws on the work of Wallace "Marine Management and the Quota 
Management System: Refonn required" 62 [Wallace] and Barry Weeber 
"Ecosystem Management Principles: New Zealand's Marine Legal Framework" 
148 [Weeber] in Seaviews above n 15. 
See (31 July 1996) 557 NZPD 14022 and text accompanying below n 83 where 
various conventions, though not enacted, were cited in Parliament as being part 
of the foundations of the 1996 Act's sustainability provisions. 
It is acknowledged that the preliminary issues of what constitutes customary 
international law and what effect it has are in themselves contentious. 
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Table 1: International Obligations - Indicative of Customary 
International Law 
AGREEMENT INDICATION OF RELEVANCE TO NZ 
Rio Declaration 1992 and Agenda 21 
(especially chapter 17) 
Principles relied on by NZ at the ICJ in Nuclear tests 
case4s 
FA O International Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries 1995 
Internationally accepted standard relevant to the 
implementation of UNCLOS46 
World Conservation Union statutes and 
regulations 
New Zealand is a member and is represented by DoC 
Table· 2: International Obligations - Binding Domestically 
AGREEMENT SIGNED RATIFIED DOMESTIC LAW 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Yes Yes Antarctic Marine Living 
Manne Living Resources, 1980 (CCAMLR) Resources Act 1981 
Convention on the Conservation of Southern Yes Yes Fisheries Act 1996 
Bluefin Tuna, 1993 
Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Yes Yes Drift Net Prohibition Act 
Long Drijlnets in the South Pacific, 1989 (Dnflnet 1991 
Convention) 
International Convention for the Regulation of Yes Yes Marine Mammals 
Whaling, 1946 Protection Act 1978 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution Yes Yes Maritime Transport Act 
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 and 1994 Part XXI 
Protocol 1996 
International Convention for the Prevention of Yes Yes Maritime Transport Act 
Pollution from Ships 197 3 and Protocol 1978 1994 
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Yes Yes Partial - Maritime 
Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Transport Act 1994 
Region, 1982 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 Yes Yes Partial - UNCLOS Act 
(UNCLOS) 1996 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 (CBD) Yes Yes Foundation of NZ 
Biological Diversity 
Strategy 1998 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the Yes Yes 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Yes Yes Fisheries Act 1996 
Provisions of the UNCLOS relating to the Amendment 1999 (No 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 2) 99/103.•7 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995 
45 See New Zealand v France (1995) General List No 97 Request for an 
examination of the situation, 21 August 1995, published in New Zealand at the 
International Court of Justice - French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1996) [New Zealandv France] . 
46 
47 
Not formally implemented in New Zealand, but given Ministerial Support "F AO 
Fisheries Ministerial Meeting" New Zealand Executive Government Speech 
Archive (10 March 1999) <http://www.executive.govt.nz1 
minister/luxton/jlsl0399 _1.htm> (last accessed 9 April 1999). 
Assented to 8 September 1999 following much protest from industry, see Report 
of the Primary Production Committee, Fisheries Amendment Bill 1999 (No 3) 
No 304-2A, iii. 
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LEAD 
AGENCY 
MFAT/ 
Mfish 
Mfish 
Mfish 
Doe/ 
MFAT 
MFAT 
MFE/ 
MSA 
MFAT/ 
DoC 
MFAT/ 
MFish/ 
MoC 
Doe! 
MFAT 
DoC 
The obligations within these documents broadly comprise the duty to 
protect the marine environment; enlarge the scope of protected areas; 
apply the precautionary principle; require environmental impact 
assessments and generally to take an integrated ecosystem approach to 
fisheries. 48 The following analysis briefly outlines each duty, and 
introduces how New Zealand does or does not comply with the 
obligations. 
I Duty to protect the marine environment 
Article 192 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982 (UNCLOS) establishes the unqualified obligation to preserve and 
protect the entire marine environment. 
Agenda 21 expands on this by providing that States should identify 
valuable marine ecosystems and habitat and provide necessary limitations 
on "use" in those areas.49 This seems to impose an obligation to carry 
out research on marine ecosystems so as to establish how "use" ought to 
be limited in order to preserve that environment. 
New Zealand has been active in the international arena in according 
weight to this provision. It relied heavily on the duty in argument 
against France on the nuclear tests issue50 and played an instrumental role 
in the Driftnet Convention. 
Domestically, the story is different. The same "guardian of the marine 
environment" which prohibited driftnetting in the South Pacific ignores 
the consequences in its own EEZ of trawl nets which destroy living 
species and habitat on the ocean's floor. 
48 
49 
50 
For a review of how these principles are operating in the international arena, see 
United Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea, Report of the Secretary-General 
53rd session N53/456. 
Agenda 21 eh 17. 86, appendix 3. 
New Zealand v France, above n 46. 
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2 Duty to enlarge the scope of protected areas 
UNCLOS,51 the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 (CBD),52 the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
1980 (CCAMLR)53 and Agenda 21 54 all require States to take measures 
necessary to protect and preserve rare and fragile ecosystems as well as 
the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species and other 
forms of marine life. 
Apart from the protected areas in the territorial sea, New Zealand mostly 
ignores this obligation. A requirement to take measures necessary to 
protect such areas assumably incorporates a requirement to ascertain 
their existence. It cannot be legitimate to allow the destruction of habitat 
and ecosystems purely because so little was known about them, and so 
escape the obligations imposed by the provision. 
3 Duty to apply the precautionary principle 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, scientific 
uncertainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation. 55 
New Zealand recognises the precautionary principle in the context of 
domestic law, 56 and cites it as a principle of international environmental 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
Article 194(5). 
Article 8. 
Article IX(2)(g). 
Chapter 17.7. 
See Rio Declaration 1992 principle 15; CCAMLR's "no data, no fish" approach 
cited in Weeber, above n 42, 162; United Nations Agreement on the 
Conservation and Mangement of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks, 1995 Article 6.2 and 6.3 reproduced in appendix 3; and the FAO 
Precautionary Approach to Fisheries reproduced in appendix 3. 
McIntyre v Christchurch City Council [1996) NZRMA 289; Greenpeace New 
Zealand Inc v Minister of Fisheries (27 November 1995) unreported, High 
Court, Wellington Registry, CP 492/93 . See also the statutory embodiment of 
the principle in the Fisheries Act 1996, s lO(d). 
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law in its submissions in the Nuclear Tests Case. 51 In practice, as 
discussed in part IV, it is not applied domestically with respect to fishing 
impacts on the marine environment. One possible explanation is that its 
application in the domestic arena would bring the Government under the 
wrath of the fishing industry. 
4 Duty to prepare an environmental impact assessment 
Where an activity is likely to cause significant damage to the environment 
various treaties impose an obligation to conduct a prior environmental 
impact assessment. 58 New Zealand is of the opinion the obligation has 
gained the status of customary international law due to its widespread 
recognition, 59 and requires environmental impact assessment for certain 
terrestrial activities. It is inconsistent to not require such measures for 
fishing activities also. 
5 Duty to take an integrated ecosystem approach to fisheries 
The CCAMLR manages the fisheries south of the Antarctic Convergence 
on the basis of the "ecosystem as a whole" .60 This is reflected in the 
57 
58 
59 
60 
New Zealand v France, above n 46, 68. 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN CLOS relating to 
the Conservation and Mangement of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995 Article 6.3(d) (reproduced in appendix 3); 1986 
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the 
South Pacific Region, 26 Il.,M 38; UNCLOS, arts 205 and 206; the ASEAN 
Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (9 July 1985) 
arts 14(1) and 20(3)(a); 1985 European Community Environment Assessment 
Directive (85/337/EEC 27 June 1985) arts 2 and 4; Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, art 2 (Finland, 
25 February 1991) 30 ILM 802; Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty, art 8 (Madrid, 4 October 1991) 30 Il.,M 1461 ; Convention on 
Biological Diversity, art 14 (5 June 1992) 31 Il.,M 822 . 
New Zealand v France, above n 46, 346 submissions of New Zealand per Judge 
Ad Hoe Sir Geoffrey Palmer. 
See especially Article II 33 reproduced in appendix 3 which expressly addresses 
the direct and indirect impact of harvesting. 
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empowering New Zealand legislation which accords broad protection to 
any "marine organism". 61 
Many of our colleagues in the international community have taken the 
holistic approach to marine management which New Zealand has not. 
This indicates those countries' recognition of the importance of their 
international obligations. It also illustrates the practice of states in the 
area which is a key component in developing international customary 
law. 
(a) Australia 
The Australian government has commissioned an in-depth study of ocean 
use a~d management. It prescribes principles for ecologically sustainable 
ocean use which include planning and management for ocean ecosystem 
health and multiple use. 62 This approach recognises that the 
understanding of ecosystem implications of decisions will often require 
information beyond that needed to manage individual resource sectors. 
The policy advocates the application of the precautionary principle and 
incorporates the concepts of duty of care and stewardship. 
Accordingly, the Australian government funds in-depth research into 
fisheries habitat, which includes the effects of harvesting on ecosystems 
and biodiversity. 63 
61 
62 
63 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources Act 1981 s 4. 
Australia's Ocean Policy, Caring - Using - Understanding <http://www. 
environment. gov .au/marine/ ocepoly/ocean _policy /public/chapter2. html> (last 
accessed 15 August 1999). 
Mike Cappo A Review and Synthesis of Australian Fisheries Habitat Research 
<http://www. aims. gov. au/pages/research/fep/afhr/afhr%2DO 1. html> (last 
accessed 26 July 1999). 
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(b)Canada 
Canada has taken an integrated ocean management approach with the 
passage of its Oceans Act 1996.64 The sustainability provisions apply to 
the ocean as a whole, in comparison to the sustainability provisions in our 
Fisheries Act 1996 which are centered around fisheries management. 
This means, in Canada, sustainability of all marine ecosystems is 
considered to be of equal importance to the sustainability of commercial 
fisheries, as opposed to being a subsidiary consideration. Part II of the 
Oceans Act prescribes the Oceans Management Strategy (OMS). The 
precautionary approach applies;65 the establishment of marine protected 
areas including in the EEZ is provided for;66 and environmental impact 
assessments may be required.
67 
This holistic approach brings ocean management under the jurisdiction of 
statutory bodies which have been primarily established for environmental 
and ecological purposes. This is in contrast with New Zealand's policy of 
managing the ocean's resources through the commercial fisheries regime. 
6 Duty to consider the needs of future generations 
This duty is implicit in most of the conventions and principles already 
discussed.68 It is provided for as a founding purpose of the 1996 Act, 
though the weight accorded to this provision in law is questionable. 69 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
45 Elizabeth II, 1996; Assented to 18th December 1996. 
Oceans Act 1996 (Canada) s 30. 
Oceans Act 1996 (Canada) s 35. 
The Oceans Act amends s 2(1) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
and s 52 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act by inserting in the 
definition of "federal lands" the internal waters, the territorial sea, the 
continental shelf and the EEZ of Canada. 
See especially the relevant part of the F AO voluntary code reproduced in 
appendix 3. 
Fisheries Act 1996 s 8, and see discussion below part IV. 
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B Concepts v Practice? 
International law on ocean management clearly reqmres a principled 
starting point of ecosystem management rather than the exploitation of 
commercially viable fish . Nonetheless, these principles will be ineffective 
in the absence of a workable fisheries management regime. 70 New 
Zealand's QMS is considered to achieve something real with respect to 
sustaining commercial fishstocks . However this should not enable New 
Zealand to use the purported success of its fisheries management regime 
as an excuse to ignore international obligations with respect to the wider 
marine environment. 
IV THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE MARINE 
ENVIRONMENT IN NEW ZEALAND 
No single Act or institution has an overall umbrella function with respect 
to the.entire marine environment on a practical basis.71 
A Inside the Territorial Zone Only 
1 Resource Management Act 1991 
This Act contains the control of coastal management, but does not 
include fisheries management. 72 However under section 11 of the 
Fisheries Act 1996, the Minister of Fisheries, in setting or varying 
sustainability measures, shall have regard to any regional policy 
statement, regional plan, or proposed regional plan under the RMA. 
Further, its provisions are worth referring to by way of comparison. 
Section 12(e) provides that no person may: 
70 
71 
For instance a fundamental flaw of the CCAMLR is that it lacks an enforcement 
regime resulting in a huge illegal catch of Patagonian toothfish with by-catch of 
over 100,000 albatrosses and petrels. See Weeber, above n 42, 162. 
For a more in-depth analysis of non-fisheries legislation applicable to the marine 
environment, see Wallace, above n 42, 62 and Weeber, above n 42, 148. 
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[D]estroy, damage, or disturb any foreshore or seabed (other than for the 
purpose of lawfully harvesting any plant or animal) in a manner that has or 
is likely to have an adverse effect on plants and animals or their habitat. 
Whether rules in regional plans can manage the adverse effects of 
fisheries activities has still to be tested in court.73 If this provision were 
to apply to fisheries, it would clearly require an environmental impact 
assessment for fishing methods likely to do damage to the seabed. 
Section 17(1) of the RMA provides that "every person has a duty to 
avoid, remedy, or mitigate any adverse effect on the environment" 
( emphasis added). This is in stark contrast to the sustainability provisions 
in the Fisheries Act 1996 which apply only to decision makers 
administering the fisheries regime, but not directly to the fishers carrying 
out activities under the regime. 
2 Marine Reserves Act 1971 
Fishing is generally excluded from all marine reserves, although the Act 
does allow recreational fishing . 74 The main purpose of the Act is to 
preserve areas for the scientific study of marine life. Marine reserves 
benefit fisheries by providing insurance against stock collapse and 
protection of critical habitats. 
14 marine reserves now cover around four per cent of the territorial 
sea. 75 There are applications or investigations underway in respect of a 
further 24 areas. 
However sanctuaries on such a small scale are inappropriate for mobile 
species and run the risk of creating isolated "island communities" that 
72 
73 
74 
75 
Fisheries management is excluded from application of the RMA by of the 
Fisheries Act 1996 s 6. 
Weeber, above n 42, 150. 
Marine Reserves Act 1971 s 3(3). 
This is compared with land where approximately 30 per cent of the area is 
protected in some form of reserve. See Kathy Walls "Developing a Network of 
Marine Reserves for New Zealand" in Seaviews, above n 15, 191, 192. 
20 
become genetically weakened and less resilient to natural shocks. 76 
There is therefore also a need for some restraint on activities in the open 
sea, such as trawl damage, so as to leave the intervening areas more 
conducive to species moveQient between sanctuaries. 
An environmental charter suggests that 5 per cent of New Zealand's 
marine floor to the outer limits of the EEZ should be classified as no-take 
marine reserves or marine protected areas by 2002, extending to 20 per 
cent by 2010.77 
B Inside the Territorial Zone and the EEZ 
I Specific species management and protection 
Marine mammals are absolutely protected by the Marine Mammals 
Protection Act 1978 and mechanisms exist for research into and 
monitoring of marine mammal bycatch. 78 
The Wildlife Act 1954 covers all birds, turtles and, since 1996, black and 
red coral and spotted black grouper. 79 The Wildlife Act is a useful legal 
mechanism for protecting areas such as seamounts which contain coral. 
However, practically, coral and other invertebrate bycatch is not 
monitored. The Wildlife Act accords no protection to marine ecosystems 
in the EEZ and territorial sea which do not contain any of the named 
species. It is unlikely that any such extension of the Act will be made 
76 
77 
78 
79 
Mary Clarke and Peter Clough New Zealand's Fisheries Co-Management and 
Property Rights Report to the NZ Seafood Industry Council Ltd, Working Paper 
98/16 (May 1998, NZIER, Wellington) 30 [Clarke]. See also The State of New 
Zealand's Environment, above n 7, 9.36 which cites fragmentation of ecosystems 
as a factor making extinction inevitable for many terrestrial species. 
Vote for the Environment Charter August 1999, environmental charter prepared 
for the 1999 General Election, supported by Environment and Conservation 
Organisations of NZ (ECO); Federated Mountain Clubs of NZ; Greenpeace; 
Royal Forest & Bird Protection Society of NZ, 22. 
Conservation Act 1987 ss 3C-3E. 
Wildlife Act 1954 schedule 7A. 
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without a marked increase in knowledge as to the diversity of benthic 
species and their resource or intrinsic value. 
Under the Conservation Act 1987 conservation strategies for marine 
mammals and wildlife can extend throughout the EEZ. 
80 Under section 
11 of the Fisheries Act 1996 the Minister is to have regard to any 
management strategy or plan under this Act in varying or setting 
sustainability measures. 
2 Environmental management and protection 
The Minister of Conservation has ownership functions and 
responsibilities for foreshore and seabed. The exercise of these functions 
and responsibilities does not appear to go beyond coastal management, 
marine reserves in the territorial sea and protection for bycatch of 
mammals and seabirds. 
The Maritime Transport Act 1994 aims to protect the marme 
environment, but its scope does not apply to actual fishing practices. 
81 
Under the Environment Act 1986 the Ministry for the Environment and 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment have advisory roles 
with respect to all aspects of environmental administration, including the 
application, operation and effectiveness of the Fisheries Act 1983 . 82 
80 
81 
82 
Conservation Act 1987 ssl7B, 17C, l7D and 17E. 
The Maritime Transport Act addresses hannful substances (part XIX); 
hazardous ships, structures and offshore installations (part XX); and dumping, 
incineration and storing of wastes (part XXI). 
Environment Act 1986 ss 16; 3l(a), (c)(i) and Schedule. See Office of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment and the Audit Office Marine 
Fisheries Management - a Joint Report of the Controller and Auditor-General 
and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (Wellington, 1990); 
and "Current Project - marine overview investigation" (1999) 3 BRMB 19. 
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3 Fisheries Acts 1983 and 1996 
These Acts are administered by the Ministry of Fisheries. The 1996 Act 
provides for environmental standards in the management of fisheries . 
Section 5 requires decision-makers to act in a manner consistent with 
New Zealand's international obligations relating to fishing: 83 
The Bill incorporates advances in international law, including those 
established in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
agreement relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish 
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks; ... the Convention on Biological 
Diversity; the Rio declaration on environment and development; and the 
code of conduct for responsible fisheries. 
The purpose of the 1996 Act is set out in section 8: 
To provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability. 
'Ensuring sustainability' means: 
(a) Maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to meet the reasonably 
foreseeable 
needs of future generations; and 
(b) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of fishing on the 
aquatic environment. 
The r_equirement to ensure sustainability is stronger than the RMA's 
statutory purpose - to promote the sustainable management of natural 
and physical resources. This fact suggests that the "utilisation" of 
fisheries resources is subservient to the environmental bottom lines set 
out in sections 8( a) and (b) of the 1996 Act. However the Ministry of 
Fisheries has argued that since the management tools within the Act 
concern control of resource extraction, so therefore this must be the 
focus of the purpose of the Act. 84 To date, the Ministry's actions accord 
with this approach. 
83 
84 
(31 July 1996) 557 NZPD 14022. 
A divergence of views on the effect of section 8 is enabled by the interpretation 
of the word "while" . For an analysis of "while" in the context of the RMA s 5, 
see Dr Benjamin Richardson "Sustainability and the Fisheries Act 1996: 
Protecting the interests of posterity?" (1998) 2 BRMB 125, 126 [Richardson] . 
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There are further problems with the requirement to provide for the 
"needs of future generations". Issues surround the definitions of "future 
generations", their "reasonably foreseeable needs, who should champion 
their rights and to what standard.
85 One academic has commented that 
the immense difficulties in ascertaining the needs of posterity militates 
against the suggestion that section 8 creates an enforceable legal 
bl. · 86 o 1gat10n. Instead it is essentially a statement of government policy 
which should promote the concept that principles of sustainability should 
underpin the approach of government agencies and can be used as a 
guide to interpretation of the legislation. 
87 
The difficulties surrounding issues of posterity should be dealt with and 
not simply dismissed as ambiguities which deprive section 8 of its entire 
legal force. After all the section 8 requirement to avoid, remedy, or 
mitigate any adverse effects of fishing on the aquatic environment cannot 
be divorced from the requirement to provide for future generations. 
Section 8 constitutes two environmental bottom lines which are 
unambiguous, and have been placed, for a reason, within an Act which 
binds the Crown. 88 
The Act also includes two sections setting out principles which shall be 
taken . into account by "all persons exercising or performing functions, 
duties, or powers under the Act" . Section 9 requires: 
85 
86 
87 
88 
(a) Associated and dependent species should be maintained above a level that 
ensures their long term viability; 
(b) Biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be maintained; 
( c) Habitat of particular significance for fisheries management should be 
protected. 
See generally Richardson, above n 84. 
Richardson, above n 84, 126. 
G Bates "Implementing ESD" (1994) 11 Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 251 , 253 . 
Fisheries Act 1996 s 7. 
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Section 10 contains a set of information principles. Paragraph (a) 
represents New Zealand's first statutory acknowledgment of the 
precautionary principle: 
(a) Decisions should be based on the best available information; 
(b) Decision makers should consider any uncertainty in the information available 
in any case; 
(c) Decision makers should be cautious when information is uncertain, 
unreliable or inadequate; 
(d) The absence of, or any uncertainty in, any information should not be used as 
a reason for postponing or failing to take any measure to achieve the purpose 
of this Act. 
Decision makers under sections 9 and 10 of the 1996 Act are only 
required to take the Act's environmental principles into account. This 
obligation is weak compared with the requirement to recognise and 
provide for the matters of national importance set out in section 6 of the 
RMA. It was considered that: 89 
"Recognise and provide for" placed too strong an obligation on persons 
exercising functions under the Act, possibly forcing them to undertake vast 
amounts of research to meet the obligation. 
Undue delay caused by inadequate information would arguably have been 
prevented by the section 2 definition of the "best available information" . 
The ecosystem approach in the 1996 Act does not have the weight it 
should have in light of New Zealand's international obligations.90 
The environmental principles in section 9, if decision makers were 
required to "recognise and provide for" them, would arguably be 
appropriate criteria to protect the ocean floor. However, as they stand, 
the principles may simply be disregarded by decision makers following 
due consideration. Decisions can only be challenged on the grounds that 
they would fail to sustain the resource in question for future generations; 
89 
90 
Primary Production Committee Fisheries Bill: Commentary (1996) vii, cited in 
Marguerite Quin "The Fisheries Act 1996: Context, Purpose, and Principles" 
(1997) 8 AULR 503, 529 [Quin] . 
Quin, above n 89, 529. 
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or that the adverse environmental effects of the activity in question could 
not be mitigated to an acceptable level. 
The section 8 environmental bottom lines could be the foundations from 
which to argue that fishing methods ought to be assessed for 
environmental impact on benthic communities. However, the argument 
has a slim chance of success given the ineffectiveness of section 10( a) 
and the 1996 Act in general to ascertain the requisite information to 
prove that these environmental bottom lines are being undermined. 
Nevertheless, if a successful argument can be made on these grounds, the 
statutory mechanism does exist for action to be taken. Section 11 
provides that the Minister may set or vary any sustainability measure for 
one or more stocks or areas.91 Sustainability measures may relate to the 
fishing methods used.92 The Minister may recommend the making of 
regulations under section 298 of the 1996 Act as he or she considers 
necessary for the purpose of implementing sustainability measures. 
93 
The intended scope of section 11 is found in the Parliamentary debates:
94 
91 
92 
93 
94 
... [T]here are limitations to the pure application of the total allowable 
commercial catch approach, because the way in which fish are caught often 
impacts on the marine environment. It will be in the interests of people 
other than those with quota in a particular fishery to ensure that the fishery 
is using methods that do the minimum damage . 
.. . [A]n outstanding example might be trawling, which damages the seabed 
environment in certain situations. There are certain stocks that have 
tl1lditionally been harvested by trawling. I believe that in the fullness of 
time that method of harvesting will be prohibited. The fish will have to be 
caught on fish-hooks, or by whatever other methods seem appropriate -
certainly by methods that do not damage the marine-floor environment. 
Fisheries Act 1996 s 11(1). 
Such measures may also relate to the catch limit; the size, sex, or biological state 
of any stock; the areas from which any stock may be taken; or the fishing season. 
Fisheries Act I 996 s 11(3)(a)-(e). 
Fisheries Act 1996 s 11(4). 
Hon Jim Sutton, (31 July 1996) NZPD 14034 (emphasis added). 
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This speech was concurred with by the then Minister of Fisheries. 95 In 
order to honour our international obligations, to acknowledge the rights 
of other stakeholders in the marine environment, and to simply avoid a 
situation of overfishing through habitat destruction, this unequivocal 
expression of statutory intent ought to be given effect to . 
4 Commercial Fisheries Regulations 
The regulations currently in force are made under section 89 of the 
Fisheries Act 1983 and impose various input controls. 96 They have 
effect out to the EEZ although most of the regulated closures are in 
inshore waters. 
For the most part, the method restrictions apply to relatively small 
defined areas within each fishery management area such as harbours and 
estuaries. The only general prohibitions on fishing methods are trawling 
by vessels over 46 metres in length within the territorial sea97 and using a 
hazardous substance to catch or destroy fish .98 
Section 297 of the 1996 Act empowers the Governor-General to 
regulate, authorise or prohibit the taking of any fish, aquatic life, or 
seaweed of any stock or species from any area; for any period; of any 
specified size; or by any method of fishing . 99 Section 298 of the 1996 
Act empowers the Governor-General to make regulations to implement 
or vary any of the sustainability measures under section 11 . 100 More 
specifically, it confers the ability to regulate so as to avoid, remedy or 
mitigate the effect of fishing-related mortality on any protected 
species. 101 
95 
96 
97 
98 
Hon Doug Kidd, (31 July 1996) NZPD 14036. 
Fisheries (Commercial Fishing) Regulations 1986 ss 22 - 53 . 
Fisheries (Commercial Fishing) Regulations 1986 s 47A. 
Fisheries Act 1996 s 234. 
99 See Fisheries Act 1996 s 297(a)(i)-(ix). 
100 Fisheries Act 1996 s 298 (a). 
IOI Fisheries Act 1996 s 298 (b) and (c) . 
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This power to make regulations 1s comprehensive and powerful. 
However, to date, the power to make regulations has only been invoked 
in "exceptional circumstances" such as when a commercially valuable 
species has been in danger of serious overfishing. 
102 
C Interim Summary - Domestic Protection for the Marine 
Environment 
Protection of the manne environment 1s plagued by statutory and 
institutional fragmentation and ineffectiveness. Inconsistencies are 
numerous. While it is not permissible to pollute the seabed under the 
Maritime Transport Act or damage it under the RMA, it is permissible to 
rip it up by dredging or bottom trawling and thereby cause irreversible 
damage under the Fisheries Acts. This situation is exacerbated by the 
Ministry of Fisheries' position that utilisation of fisheries takes 
precedence over the sustainability provisions. 
In reality, all the seafloor outside of marine reserves is unprotected. 
Moreover, nominally protected species such as the red and black coral 
are routinely impacted by fishing activities. 
103 No one has an accurate 
knowledge of where such communities occur. This has the effect that 
fishers target seamounts for orange roughy quite freely, while their 
methods of fishing "unintentionally" destroy coral thickets in the process. 
No one is there to see the effects and prosecute. 
104 
102 See Sanford (South Island) Ltd & Ors v Moyle & Ors (10 November 1989) 
unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 3/89 [Sanford] and New 
Zealand Fishing Industry Association (inc) & Ors v Minister of Fisheries & Ors 
(22 July 1997) unreported, Court of Appeal, 82-97, CA 83-97, CA 96-97, 
Richardson P, Gault, Keith, Blanchard & Tipping JJ [NZ Fishing Industry 
Association]. 
103 E7mail from Dennis Gordon, Marine Biodiversity & Systematics, NIWA, 4 
August 1999. 
104 The Ministry of Fisheries observer programme which was mostly concerned with 
marine mammal and seabird by-catch has reduced significantly with the 
reduction of joint venture and foreign licensed vessels in our waters. See The 
State of New Zealand's Environment, above n 7, 9.107. This is unfortunate 
given the opinion that bycatch rates of marine mammals appears to be correlated 
with observer coverage, see Baird Nonfish Species and Fisheries Interactions 
Working Group Report (94/1) {MAF, Wellington 1994) 7. 
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Some scientists have argued that all the seafloor ought to be regarded as 
protected, except for those areas where we can know that fishing or 
other extractions will have tolerable effects. Ministry of Fisheries 
sources currently admit that information regarding the impact of fishing 
methods on fish habitat is limited. They say that "this is a difficult and 
expensive area of research. Research is currently contracted to improve 
that information" .105 
Two types of errors have been identified with environmental policy 
making. 
106 
A type I error concludes that there is an effect, but actually 
there is not one. Allowing potentially destructive practices to continue 
while admitting knowledge is limited represents the Ministry's desire to 
avoid a type I error. Making this error results in a loss of revenue. The 
financial implications are easily understood. A type II error concludes 
there is no effect, when in fact one exists. This error results in a high 
probability of loss of biodiversity and adverse impact on the marine 
environment. However the ecological implications can only be predicted 
from inferential data and are especially difficult to ascertain where 
impacts are cumulative. 
Most of the focus lies in eliminating type I errors as a result of industry 
lobby. The burden of proving that there is no effect lies with the 
regulator. This is contrary to the precautionary principle which, in the 
marine environment context, requires the burden to shift to the fisher to 
disprove an effect takes place when serious environmental consequences 
are possible. 
The failure to give adequate effect to the sustainability provisions 
amounts to a failure to carry out our international obligations; a failure to 
give effect to the intention of Parliament in enacting the sustainability 
105 E-mail from Mark Edwards, Ministry of Fisheries, 3 August 1999. 
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provisions; and a failure to recognise that the Courts have pronounced 
that regulation making power can go as far as may be necessary for 
proper manne conservation purposes, both of ITQ and non ITQ 
• 107 species. 
V HOW IS THIS FRAMEWORK BEING IMPLEMENTED ... 
OR NOT? 
A The Theory 
1 The original idea 
An early review of New Zealand's QMS specifically stated that the 
responsibility for managing fishing should be assigned to those who hold 
the rights to fish; and the responsibility for protecting broader public 
interests in the conservation of resources is the responsibility of 
Government. 108 The author stated the Government's essential role is to 
identify the public interests that are affected by fishing, and to protect 
them by setting out enforceable "conservation prescriptions" within 
which those who have rights to fish can organise themselves and exercise 
their rights. "Conservation prescriptions" would be designed following a 
systematic consultation process to accommodate public participation, and 
to channel the views and advice of interest groups into the decision 
making. This approach would have been consistent with the underlying 
principles of the Resource Management Act 1991 . Instead, non-
commercial stakeholders in fisheries have to fight to be heard on these 
issues. The public interest in conservation issues, especially in the EEZ, 
has been largely ignored. 
106 P Dayton, S Thrush, M Agardy, R Hofman "Environmental Effects of Marine 
Fishing" 15 (1995) Aquatic Conservation: Marine & Freshwater Ecosystems 
205. 
107 See Sanford and New Zealand Fishing Industry Association, above n 102. 
108 Pearce, above n 6, 18. 
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2 Fisheries 2010 Strategy. 
This draft strategy is being developed by the Ministry of Fisheries and 
various stakeholders including Maori, environmental groups, recreational 
fishers, the wider public and commercial fishers. 109 It addresses the need 
to have an ecosystem based fisheries management approach which 
recognises that New Zealand's fisheries are part of the wider aquatic 
ecosystem and acknowledges that markets have difficulties with fisheries 
policy issues: 110 
D Future generations are not traders in the market... Their ability to meet 
their own needs should not be compromised by decisions made today. 
D The links between economic activity and ecosystem damage are often 
indirect. Cumulative and indirect effects on the life-supporting capacity 
of ecosystems can occur if appropriate limits are not in place. 
D Environmental effects and risks are not evenly spread and unforeseen 
effects may be irreversible. 
D 'Spillover' effects are common. 
Nonetheless the Strategy emphasises that government intervention would 
not necessarily achieve better results citing reasons such as limited 
information and influence by sectional interests. The government 
describes its task as being: 111 
[T]o develop rules and institutions that promote good environmental 
outcomes within the framework of a pluralistic society and market 
economy. This may require amending the rules governing existing 
property rights or the creation of new ones. In other instances, it will 
involve introducing rules and regulations designed to protect 
environmental values not easily secured by market exchanges. 
This passage recognises the scope of the property right given to fishers is 
too wide and ill-defined with respect to environmental matters. This 
Ministry's vision includes people with rights to harvest fisheries having 
responsibility, and being held accountable, for the management of those 
109 Ministry of Fisheries Changing Course - Sustainable Fisheries Jn a Healthy 
Aquatic Ecosystem <http://www.fish .govt.nzJstrategy.htm> (last accessed 10 
April 1999) [Changing Course] . 
11° Changing Course, above n 109, 5. 
111 Changing Course, above n 109, 6. 
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rights, within environmental limits and standards set by Government. 
This vision leaves open to the government the option to either regulate, 
or better define the duties associated with the fishers' property rights. 
Problematic areas in fisheries include depletion due to persistent over-
fishing, leading to the collapse of a fishery; potential long-term damage to 
habitat caused by fishing; and high levels of non-compliance with 
fisheries laws. Despite this, the Strategy goes on to advocate that 
sustainable fisheries involves "widespread voluntary compliance with 
fisheries laws" .112 This represents a clear contradiction in approach. A 
property rights regime requires a system of enforcement for it to function 
properly. 113 
The Strategy, for all that it "embodies a world-wide trend towards eco-
system management of natural resources" remains centered around the 
commercial fishery . It looks at eco-system management as an offspring 
of fisheries management, as opposed to fisheries management taking 
place under the wider umbrella of eco-system management. In this sense 
it is less of an advance towards integrated ocean management and 
recognition of µon-use values than those steps our Australian and 
Canadian counterparts have made. 
B The Practice 
1 Devolution to the industry 
While apparently binding themselves to act in a manner consistent with 
sustainability, decision makers under the Fisheries 2010 Strategy and the 
Fisheries Act 1996 are simultaneously doing their utmost to remove 
themselves from the industry. 
112 Changing Course, above n 109, 10. 
113 See tex't accompanying Hartley, below n 119. 
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The rationale is that as long as management of fisheries remains with 
Government, although holders of rights of access and harvest are not 
prohibited from making investments in resource enhancement, they have 
no guarantee that management decisions will respect their investments. 114 
The 1996 Fisheries Act Amendment 1999 contains devolution provisions 
whereby core fisheries services may be put under the control of the 
industry by regulation. 115 These include functions, duties or powers of 
the chief executive which are exclusively or primarily associated with the 
administration of commercial fisheries and includes the keeping of 
registers .116 This is consistent with the Government policy of "getting 
out" of areas that are not essential and of direct benefit to the long-term 
economic, social and infrastructure development ofNew Zealand.117 
2 Lack of enforcement 
The Ministry of Fisheries remains responsible for enforcement under the 
1999 Amendment Act, but continually struggles with a lack of resources. 
It relies on the theory that the incentive to conserve the resource lies in 
the property rights regime it administers. us This reliance is contrary to 
the key requirement that property rights, and the legal system that 
underpins them need to be enforced. 119 Enforcement requires coercion, 
or the threat of coercion. Audit of quota holders and licensed fish 
receivers is the primary mechanism used to ensure compliance under the 
114 
115 
Alison Rieser "Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries: 
Contracting for the Commons?" 24 Ecology Law Quarterly 813, 820 [Rieser). 
See Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment 1999 s 65 which inserts new Part 15A. 
116 See Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment 1999 s 65 which inserts news 296A. The 
117 
118 
provision is careful not to devolve any functions, duties or powers of the 
Minister or fisheries officers. 
"1998 Aquaculture Conference" New Zealand Government Speech Archive 
Address by John Lm.1on, Minister of Fisheries (27 August 1998) <http://www. 
executive.govt.nzlminister/luxton/s980827.htm> (last accessed 9 April 1999). 
See "Feeble Proposal for Spirits Bay from the Ministry of Fisheries" Ecolink July 
1999 8 as an example of a Ministry proposal for voluntary closure of fishing 
grounds where the scallop fishery is in danger of collapse, on the grounds that 
the area is remote and hard to police. 
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QMS .. However a paper-based enforcement system ignores problems of 
dumping, high grading and the black market and is unlikely to pick up on 
misreporting where licensed fish receivers are also quota owners. 
This theoretical concept is reinforced by opinions at the grassroots of 
both industry and industry watchdog organisations. Citing the demise of 
the gem fish industry and the trouble facing the orange roughy fishery, a 
small commercial fisher has said "The industry is not capable of looking 
after the fishery" . 
120 According to observer and analyst Cath Wallace, 
the fishing industry is "manifestly untrustworthy" . 
121 
The fact that it is questionable whether the property rights based 
incentive is sufficient to conserve commercial stocks is indicative that the 
same incentive is insufficient to protect the habitat of the target species 
and the marine environment. 
3 Research 
The recent passage of the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment enables 
commercial fishers to either commission research, or do it themselves. 
122 
The chief executive remains responsible to the Minister for the quality of 
research through setting standards and specifications and that the 
119 Peter Hartley Conservation Strategies for New Zealand (Tasman Institute, N
ew 
Zealand Business Roundtable 1997) 60 [Hartley] . 
120 Gerry Evans "Small fisherman in a big sea" The Dominion, Wellington, 4 
September 1999, 21 quoting John Inkster, Cook Strait hoki fisherman. 
Graeme Speden "Minister protects the minnows by mollycoddling the shark
s" 121 
The Independent, Wellington, 7 October 1998, 9. 
122 Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment 1999 s 65 inserts new Part 15 A "Performan
ce 
of Services by Approved Organisations". Note that Supplementary Order Pa
per 
No 164, (Wednesday 24 March 1999) cl 63 and schedule 8A provided that 
purchase of research and stewardship of catch and effort databases may not 
be 
performed by an approved service delivery organisation. The clarification w
as 
introduced following an outcry to the Bill, but was dropped before the final 
passage. 
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Minister may take any lack of reliable information into account when 
setting the TAC or T ACC. 123 
There are several implications with devolving research to the industry. 
The first is that the bare minimum of any kind of research will be done. 
The second is that any research that is done will be focused more on 
exploratory fishing rather than on stock assessment, sustainability and 
ecosystem effects. 124 Absent guidelines as to what sort of research 
should be commissioned, it is not impossible to think that industry could 
spend a huge portion of its research budget on market and product 
research. 125 The third is that research bodies who speak out about any 
negative effects fisheries have on marine ecosystems will be muted 
because of the pressure of tendering their services to the industry.126 
Finally, research based on catch per unit effort data as reported by quota 
holders is not representative. Because technology allows fishers to find 
fish with increasing accuracy, catch return may increase even when effort 
remains constant and population is declining. 
This approach fails to promote and facilitate the development and 
conduct of marine scientific research, as required by Article 23 9 of 
UNCLOS and Article 12(b) of the Biodiversity Convention.127 The 
Ministry has acknowledged that more information is required in order to 
h · · d. h 128 manage t e manne envtronment accor mg to an ecosystem approac . 
Its actions do not accord with its words. 
123 Report from the Primary Production Committee on the Fisheries Amendment 
Bill, no 258-2 xi. 
124 Satellite pictures taken 850 km above sea level tell trawlennen exactly where the 
fish are feeding, enabling them to treble their catch rates. See Keith Perry "Sky-
eye putting fish in NZ nets" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 21 July 1999, A3 
[Perry]. 
125 This is the type of research which fishing companies have commissioned in the 
past, FORST Research Strategy for the Public Good Science Fund 1996/7 -
200011 Foundation for Research, Science and Technology, Wellington, cited in 
Wallace, above n 42, 69. 
126 Wallace, above n 42, 69. 
127 Quin, above n 89, 530. 
128 Changing Course, above n 109, 8. 
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Even with research commissioned by the Ministry, the budget has been 
following a trend of decline in nominal and real terms.
129 
The cuts are 
not justifiable given that current stock biomass estimates are only 
available for around 10 per cent of QMS stocks. 
130 
4 Pressure to raise catch limits 
Industry tends to press for increases and oppose decreases in the TAC.
131 
Wallace suggests this is driven by a high discount rate which results from 
pressure to pay off loans for vessels and to avoid cuts in quota which are 
recognised as bankable assets. This suggests that the asset which the 
property rights incentive is designed to protect has become the quota, as 
opposed to the fishstock. Another reason is that demand for fish is 
relatively inelastic. Commercial fishers are not often subject to lower 
prices when more is put on the market. 
5 Summary 
There is little evidence in the documentation of research planning, 
budgeting or the decisions on catch limits and other "sustainability" 
measures that the requirements to consider international obligations, 
future generations' needs and adverse impacts of fishing on the 
environment or the environmental principles of the Fisheries Act 1996 
have been applied. 
132 
Despite a completely new set of environmental obligations in the 1996 
Act, the Ministry has continued its focus on fish stocks and the MSY 
129 Industry has allegedly been instrumental in obtaining the cuts to the research 
budget, especially the Fishing Industry Board (now the Seafood Industry 
Council) and the commercially focussed Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries 
Commission, see Wallace, above n 42, 69 . 
130 Wallace, above n 42, 69. See generally Ministry of Fisheries Report from the 
Fishery Assessment Plenary Stock Assessments and Yield Estimates (annual). 
For an example of industry pressure to increase or maintain catch limits, see 
New Zealand Fishing Industry Association, above n 102. 
131 
132 Wallace, above n 42, 71 
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target, while occasionally addressing the visible impacts of fishing on 
marine mammal and seabird bycatch. 133 Benthic species have been 
mostly neglected. 
It is arguable that the broad discretion conferred on decision makers by 
the sustainability provisions of the 1996 Act have been relied upon to 
avoid institutionalising legally binding commitments. 134 Another possible 
reason is that regulation is anomalous to the free-market property rights 
based policy underlying the QMS. 
VI QMS POLICY - PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A Property 
The aim of ITQs is to minimise the common property nature of the 
fishery by attempting to create a private property right. The QMS is 
intended to eliminate the rush for fish, the destructive competition for the 
limited available catch, and over-capitalisation of the industry. 135 It is 
accepted both in common parlance and at ministerial level that the QMS 
confers property rights in the harvest of the fishery resource. 136 
133 Wallace, above n 42, 72 
134 Wallace, above n 42, 72 
135 Pearse, above n 6, 5. 
136 See definitions in Changing Course above n 109 "QMS: based on individual 
transferable property rights ... "; Seafood NZ Significance in 2010 <http://www. 
seafood.co.nz/Foresight/ significance_in_2010.htm> (last accessed 10/04/99) 
"The property rights based systems by which fishing rights are allocated... give 
the industry the necessary security to make the very large investments in vessels, 
processing plant, research and development, and marketing infrastructure 
needed to compete effectively on world markets."; Ministry of Fisheries Review 
of the Fisheries Act 1996 <http://www.fish.govt.nz/review/ indexl.htm> (last 
accessed 13/03/99) "QMS: Individual transferable property rights used to 
manage New Zealand's commercial fishery" . But see Ministry of Fisheries 5 
Year Strategic Plan <http://www.fish.govt.nz/strat_plan/index.htm> (last 
accessed 10/04/99) at 15 "QMS ... used ITQs to manage New Zealand 
commercial fisheries and so ensure sustainable utilisation." (emphases added). 
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The incidents of "the full liberal concept of ownership" are: 
137 
(a) the right to possession of a thing; 
(b) the right to use a thing; 
(c) the right to manage a thing; 
(d) the right to income derived from others' use of a thing; 
( e) the right to the capital value of a thing; 
(f) the right to security against expropriation of a thing; 
(g) the power to sell, give or bequeath a thing; 
(h) lack of any tenn on the possession of those rights in respect of a thing; 
(i) the duty to refrain from using the thing in a way that harms others; 
(j) the potential liability that judgments may be executed against the thing; and 
(k) the expectation that any rights which others may have in the thing will revert 
on termination of those rights. 
Property rights in natural resources will not necessarily fit all of these 
criteria. It is not the case that property rights either exist or do not; they 
exist imperfectly along a continuum of more precisely defined rights. 
138 
The effectiveness of the QMS depends on the characteristics of the quota 
rights, the way they are administered, the restrictions on their holders, the 
degree of influence quota owners and other interested parties have over 
fisheries management decisions and the extent of legal protection 
afforded to non-commercial values associated with the fishery.
139 
Most academic works which concern property rights in natural resources 
emanate from free-marketeers. Such writing focuses primarily on 
characteristics such as duration, flexibility, exclusivity, quality of title, 
transferability and divisibility and how to enhance those rights. 
140 When 
these rights are well defined, the argument follows that owners of 
resource property rights that have a positive market value will receive 
any benefit from improving, and suffer any losses :from degrading, 
resource value. 
141 
137 
138 
Waldrom J The Right to Private Property (1986) 49 cited in David Kirkpatrick 
"Property Rights - Do You Have Any?" New Zealand Journal of Environmental 
Law l (1997) 267, 271 [Kirkpatrick] . 
Clarke, above n 76, 25 . 
139 Pearse, above n 6, 11 and Kaitilin Gaffney Property Rights Based Fisheries 
140 
141 
Management: Lessons from New Zealand's Quota Management System (MCA 
Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1997) 56. 
See for example Clarke above n 76, 26; and Hartley, above n 119, 60. 
Hartley, above n l 19, 49. 
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Few works dwell specifically on the duty to refrain from using the thing 
in a _way that harms others. One exception is Kirkpatrick who 
emphasises that property rights are rights of people against other 
people.142 For instance ownership of a car refers to a complex web of 
rights and duties which that person has with many others: rights against 
all others to immediate possession; duties to other road users; the liberty 
to drive on public roads and the obligations to observe the Road Code. 
The following discussion comments briefly on the nature of the property 
right in ITQ with emphasis on the duties which should attach to that 
right. 
B The Nature of the ITQ Property Right 
1 Legislation 
The nature of rights in ITQ are unique. The 1983 Act completely avoids 
the term "property". The 1996 Act follows in its footsteps, but is more 
helpful in that it says ITQ are capable of being "owned" and adds the 
ability to use quota as a registered security (although these provisions are 
not yet in force) .143 The general characteristics ofITQ as listed in section 
27 of the 1996 Act represent most of the components contained in the 
"bundle of rights" approach to defining what is property. Yet the 
provision expressly states it does not confer any right. 
Similar wording is used in parallel US and Australian legislation. 144 The 
intent behind this language is to prevent ITQ holders from developing 
142 Kirkpatrick, above n 137, 272. 
143 See especially Fisheries Act 1996 ss 65 - 74 which deals with annual catch 
entitlement (ACE) and Part VIII which creates a system for registration of 
transfers, mortgages and caveats. Sources at the Ministry of Fisheries say the 
prerequisite to the implementation of the system for registration of transfers, 
mortgages and caveats is the establishment of the ACE regime which is unlikely 
to take place before 2000. 
144 For America see 16 U.S.C. § 1853(d)(2)(A), (3)(D) (1997); In Australia ITQs 
are described as "statutory fishing rights" in the Fisheries Management Act 
1991 (Cth) s 21(1). 
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"investment-backed expectations" that could give rise to a constitutional 
requirement that government compensate them for the elimination of 
such rights. 
145 
Nonetheless, New Zealand's legislative provisions seem to accord a right 
akin to a private property right. 
Sections 28P - 28ZG of the 1983 Act provide for "dealings in quota" and 
establish a register for each quota management area which records details 
of quota holders, lessors, lessees and all relevant transfers. 
It is currently possible to use an ITQ in a transaction by way of security, 
although such a transaction is not capable of registration. 
146 
Restrictions 
on transfers and leases relate to minimum holdings of quota and interests 
in quota, 147 the power of the Crown to acquire, hold, transfer, lease, or 
cancel quotas in certain circumstances, 
148 and aggregation limits. 
149 
Restrictions of any kind tend to lower the value of quota as a property 
interest, so it is important to ensure that they are effective in their 
intended purpose.
150 
The right to take fish conferred under quota is exclusive in the sense that 
fish subject to the QMS cannot be taken for sale other than under 
quotaY1 Quota rights are issued with perpetual terms.
152 
145 For America see the Fifth Amendment; For Australia see s 51 (31) of the 
Constitution. 
146 Fisheries Act 1983 s 28Q(6). The commencement of Part VIII of the 1996 Act 
which provides for registration of transfers, mortgages, caveats and priorities 
will bring the regime closer to one of property rights. This is not expected to 
happen until at least late 2000. 
147 Under the Fisheries Act 1983 s 28S no one quota-holder can hold more than 
35% of the total commercial quota in offshore fisheries and 20% in inshore 
fisheries. (See Fisheries Act 1996 s 59 for new aggregation limits not in force; 
and s 74 for minimum holdings of annual catch entitlement not in force.) 
Further, quota-holders must be citizens of New Zealand or at least 75% New 
Zealand owned if they are a corporation. 
148 Fisheries Act 1983 s 28U. See also Fisheries Act 1996 s 50 (not in force) . 
149 Fisheries Act 1983 ss 28W, 28Y, 28Z. See also Fisheries Act 1996 ss 56 - 58. 
150 Pearse, above n 6, 12. 
151 Fisheries Act 1983 s 28ZA. 
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ITQs represent a proportion of the T ACC. 153 Percentage quota is less 
certain and less secure as a property right than specific tonnages. 154 The 
Government can increase or decrease the TAC for any fishery without 
providing any compensation to the industry.155 For example, any 
reduction in the TAC may have the effect of reducing certain fishers' ITQ 
to less than the minimum holding of quota or interest in quota. 156 This 
event would render that person's right to use their quota useless. 157 
On the other hand, assigning quota-holders defined shares in current 
catch and also in potential yields, arguably gives them strong incentives 
to support good management research and enhancement. 
The legislation does not expressly confer any duties on ITQ holders as an 
incident of the right they hold which are wider than the duties to comply 
with the legislation as it specifically effects their target species. That is, 
- so long as fishers only catch fish for which they hold quota, or comply 
with the deemed value system for bycatch and various regulations with 
respect to certain areas, their right to take fish is unaccompanied by 
general statutory duties with respect to the marine environment. 
152 See Fisheries Act 1996 s 27(a). 
153 Until 1989, quotas were denominated in tonnes. Quotas were changed to 
percentages of the TAC to allow for adjustments in T ACs without requiring the 
Government to intervene as buyer or seller in the quota market. This 
intervention proved too costly following the gross over-estimation of the 
154 
155 
productivity of the orange roughy stocks. 
The Fisheries Act 1996 s 4 2 ( not in force) expresses quota in terms of shares as 
whole numbers where the sum of the whole stock is 100,000,000. This 
terminology enhances the perception that ITQs are private property rights. 
See Fisheries Act 1983 SS 280B, 280D, 280E. 
156 Fisheries Act 1983 s 28S(5). 
157 Fisheries Act 1983 s 28S(2). A similar power exists for a consent authority 
under the RMA to cancel a resource consent in certain circumstances without 
compensation in ss 85 and 126. 
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2 Case law 
In NZ Fishing Industry Association (Inc) v Minister of Fisheries
158 
commercial interests challenged the Minister of Fisheries' decision to 
reduce the T ACC for snapper in QMA 1 by 3 9 per cent. The Minister 
assumed he was required to do this by law so as to move towards MSY. 
The biomass of snapper for QMA 1 was estimated to be 50 per cent 
below that required to provide MSY. Industry were successful in their 
challenge to the 1995 and 1996 decisions on the grounds that the 
Minister failed to take into account relevant considerations. However the 
cut in T ACC was made effective for the 1997 year. The Court of Appeal 
held that while quota is undoubtedly a valuable species of property, the 
rights . inherent in that property are not absolute, and are subject to the 
provisions of the legislation establishing them. The legislation contains 
the capacity for quota to be reduced without compensation. In the words 
of McGechan J in the High Court, "the ITQ constitute( s) a form of 
property right.. . (which is) a right; but now is a right subject to over-
ride" _ 1s9 
This approach is consistent with the earlier case of Sanford (South 
Island) Ltd & Ors v Moyle & Ors. 
160 In that case the Minister introduced 
regulations to reduce salmon bycatch by commercial trawlers fishing for 
red cod and barracuda in QMA 3. From December to February, the 
waters off Banks Peninsula are rich with red cod and barracuda, as well 
as returning sea run salmon. The bycatch of salmon over six fishing years 
ranged from 12.2 tonnes to 68.6 tonnes in 1986/87.
161 
67 per cent of the salmon bycatch was caught by trawlers over 23 metres 
in length. In 1988 the Minister introduced a ban on trawling by trawlers 
158 New Zealand Fishing Industry Association, above n 102. 
159 NZ Federation of Commercial Fishermen Inc & Ors v Minister of Fisheries (24 
April 1997) unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 237/95, 90 per 
McGechanJ. 
160 Sanford, above n 102. 
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in excess of 23 metres off specified areas of Banks Peninsula from mid-
December to the end of February. 162 The plaintiffs were caught by the 
ban at the prime time of year. They claimed large losses arising from 
being forced to fish elsewhere and submitted that the Minister acted in 
complete disregard of their rights as ITQ holders. 163 
McGechan J decided it was not likely that Parliament intended to 
facilitate the destruction of the marine environment, particularly where 
fish may have some recreational or commercial importance. He notes the 
property element inherent in the ITQ is to be given proper recognition, 
but subject to that the section 89 regulation making power can go as far 
as may be necessary for proper marine conservation purposes, both of 
ITQ and non ITQ species. 
McGechan J found the regulation did not go so far as to render 
ineffective ITQ rights of the plaintiffs. 164 
3 What the case law shows 
The property right in ITQ is subject to statutory override. Similarly, it 
has been held that "the concept of sustainable management [in the RMA] 
takes priority over private property rights" . 165 But in fisheries, this 
override is only used in "exceptional circumstances" such as when a 
fishery is in danger of collapse or severe overfishing. 
Commercial fishers consider their status as stakeholders in the marine 
environment to be entrenched by virtue of the property rights they hold 
161 This amounted to one third of the fish believed to be returning that summer. 
162 Regulation made pursuant to the Fisheries Act 1983 s 89(l)(a). 
163 Sanford, above n 102, 6. 
164 His Honour's reasons were that the regulation did not reduce the QMA; did not 
reduce the TAC as the tonnage was still available over the remaining months; 
prohibited fishing over a relatively small area; prohibited fishing for a limited 
period; and only prohibited large boats from operating. 
165 Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995) NZRMA 462,478 (HC). 
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and will attempt to use those rights to trump those with lesser rights or 
no rights. In Sanford v Moyle the salmon bycatch was so significant, the 
plaintiffs cannot have been unaware of the potential impact on the 
commercial industry of the non-ITQ species, or for that matter, the 
recreational fishery . Yet they undertook legal proceedings to maintain 
their right to catch their ITQ species, while knowingly having a 
destructive impact on a fishery to which no one could claim property 
rights. 
It may well have been the commercial interest of stakeholders in the 
salmon industry which lobbied the Minister to make the regulation which 
was the subject of the litigation. There are undoubtedly many other 
instances where fishers trawl up copious amounts of other species of 
marine fauna and flora in the exercise of their ITQ property right which 
are not seen, reported or monitored. 
New Zealand Fishing Industry Association v Minister of Fisheries 
represents a clear indication that the property rights based incentive to 
protect stocks does not work on its own. Sanford v Moyle shows the 
incentive is even weaker for non-QMS species. A logical extrapolation is 
that any incentive to protect the marine environment arising from the 
property rights regime must be almost nil. 
166 There are two possibilities 
for supplementing the property right conferred on fishers . The first is 
regulation involving input controls. However this would be seen as a 
backwards step given that the QMS was implemented in response to 
failures of the previous system of input controls. The second option is to 
better define property rights in fisheries in relation to duties to the marine 
environment and other stakeholders in the marine environment. This will 
be further explored in Part VII. 
166 This is consistent with the suggestion that fishers are more concerned with 
protecting their quota asset than fishstock asset. 
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4 Uncertainty and lack of compensation 
In Sanford v Moyle the Court suggested that the making of regulations 
which result in the plaintiffs facing possible losses without legal rights to 
compensation under the legislation seemed to be against the spirit of the 
QMS and its intended commercial certainties, and that the Minister ought 
to inquire into the matter.167 
The Fisheries Act 1983 provides in section 280D that no compensation 
is payable in the event a T ACC is reduced. This provision has been 
criticised for two reasons. Firstly, the loss is borne disproportionately by 
commercial fishers as opposed to recreational and customary interests. 
Second, it injects a significant amount of commercial uncertainty into the 
property rights regime. 
The first argument omits to mention that the next provision, section 
280E, provides that additional quota created by an increase in the T ACC 
is offered on a proportionate basis free of charge to those persons who 
suffer loss under the previous provision. In other words, commercial 
fishers also benefit disproportionately under the regime as a result of 
having entrenched rights. 
The second argument would hold true if the starting point was a pure 
economic model of property rights in natural resources. Any outside 
interference does "inject commercial uncertainty" into the model. 
However that starting point is unrealistic. Fisheries has always been an 
industry subject to significant ecological and commercial uncertainty 
arising from climatic extremes and natural events such as toxic algal 
blooms. A lack of compensation injects no more uncertainty into the 
system than what was there. In fact the imposition of the property rights 
regime as previously discussed creates commercial certainty in the 
167 Sanford, above n 102, 11. 
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industry. Ministerial control of the TAC enhances ecological and 
commercial certainty by providing a safeguard for target stock. 
If fishers fish unsustainably in the face of declining stock and habitat 
destruction, they eventually face the closure or collapse of the fishery . 
No compensation would be payable for that. A T ACC reduction is a 
significantly lesser cost than the cost of a collapsed fishery. And it is a 
collapsed fishery which it is ultimately designed to prevent. It is a 
safeguard of the fishers' interests, as well as a measure for the public 
interest at the cost of industry. The argument that reducing T ACC so as 
to mitigate or remedy adverse effects created by either natural extremes 
or the fishers' activities themselves should be compensable lacks logic. 
Finally, when discussing issues of compensation, it is worth remembering 
the original nature of the common law public right of fishing. Prior to 
the introduction of the QMS fish were a public resource, albeit subject to 
regulation and a permit system. The creation of the private right to the 
harvest of fish created wealth which was taken away from the public and 
allocated as a windfall to commercial fishers free of charge and with no 
tangible benefit to the taxpayer. 168 If fishers fish a stock or species down 
to an unsustainable level, this involves a cost to the general public. 
Publicly funding compensation to industry for a T ACC reduction 
essentially involves the taxpayer paying the cost of the loss of the 
resource twice. 
5 Specificity 
The QMS in practice focuses entirely on fish mortality to achieve a target 
population level that theoretically will produce a sustainable yield. 
168 Analysis of the social implications of this redistribution is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
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However overfishing is often less related to fish mortality than the result 
of failure to control when, where and how fishing occurs. 169 
Because impacts to habitat can not be quantified, they tend to be ignored. 
One proposal is to replace the rate of fishing mortality definition with 
cumulative fishing impact, and to describe and quantify, where possible, 
all gear impact on ecosystem productivity. 170 Such a suggestion is 
especially salient to New Zealand where marine ecosystem management 
is almost entirely dependant on the fisheries management scheme. 
The suggestion is administratively feasible. Fishers declare the method 
they are using on statutory catch effort retums.171 The chief executive 
may set conversion factors which shall be used to determine the 
greenweight of any fish, aquatic life, or seaweed. 172 In doing so, it may 
be appropriate to consult with Maori, environmental, commercial and 
recreational interests.173 The chief executive may issue a certificate 
specifying conversion factors for a particular vessel which must be used 
to determine the weight of any fish. 174 Such a certificate may be subject 
to conditions, including conditions relating to methods of taking fish. 175 
This prov1s1on provides a framework within which a system of 
"cumulative fishing impact" could operate. As a basic example, take two 
fishers who each have 10 tonnes of quota for snapper and on one 
particular trip, catch 2 tonnes each. Fisher A takes fish by bottom 
trawling, which has a high impact on the marine environment, but 
involves low immediate costs of production. Fisher B takes snapper by 
169 Rieser, above n 114, 813 . 
170 Smolowitz, above n 35. 
171 Fisheries Act 1996 s 189 and Fisheries (Reporting) Regulations 1990. See 
appendix 4. 
172 Fisheries Act 1996 s 188(1); Fisheries Act 1996 s 2 provides that "Greenweight" 
is the weight of fish before processing. 
173 Fisheries Act 1996 s 188(1). 
174 Fisheries Act 1996 s 188(2). 
175 Fisheries Act 1996 s 188(3)(b). Conditions may also relate to methods of 
processing, packing and labelling of fish, aquatic life or seaweed. 
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bottom longlining whereby the impact on the marine environment is far 
less, but the immediate cost of production is far greater in terms of time 
taken and labour used to catch the fish. Currently the spillover costs of 
environmental damage and decreased biodiversity which arise from fisher 
A's bottom trawling method are ignored. The 2 tonnes of snapper taken 
by fisher A has a higher impact on the marine environment than the 2 
tonnes of snapper taken by fisher B. Fisher A is exercising a right to fish 
in a way which amounts to a cost to other stakeholders in the marine 
environment. The result is an inefficient allocation of resources. 
It may be possible to internalise this externality by usmg conversion 
factors to artificially inflate the greenweight of fish caught using methods 
with harmful impacts, and to likewise deflate the greenweight of fish 
caught using more friendly methods.
176 
For instance the 2 tonnes of snapper taken using bottom trawling by 
fisher A could be multiplied by a conversion factor of say 1.5. This 
would deem fisher A to have caught 3 tonnes of snapper. The 2 tonnes 
of snapper taken using bottom long lining by fisher B could be multiplied 
by O. 5. This would deem fisher B to have caught 1 tonne of snapper. 
Fisher B would therefore have 9 tonnes of quota remaining for the year. 
Fisher A would have 7 tonnes. The ratio of quota which fisher A is 
deemed to have used to that which fisher B is deemed to have used 
would in theory be the ratio of the value of all the natural resources fisher 
A takes to the value of all the resources fisher B takes. 
177 
This is an extremely simplistic example, but does contain functions 
fundamental to fisheries management. The externality cost involved in 
using destructive fishing impacts is internalised to the fisher who uses 
176 Artificial inflation of catch weight by certain methods would be imposed as a 
condition of using those methods pursuant to s 188(2) and (3). 
177 This multiplier would need to be determined by fisheries economists and 
environmental scientists, and possibly following consultation with various 
stakeholder groups. 
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those methods, and the consumer to whom the increased cost of 
production is passed on. This increased cost of production does not 
involve third party transaction losses as the case of a tax and subsidy, 
although ultimately the effect on the supply of fish is the same as if a tax 
were imposed. Conversely, the suggestion provides an incentive to use 
less destructive impacts which are not as commercially viable as methods 
such as bottom trawling. 178 Industry will have an added incentive to 
come up with more cost-efficient environmentally friendly means of 
catching fish. One of the consequences of the suggestion is that 
whichever method is chosen, the price of snapper will increase. However 
the increase in price simply represents the internalisation of the true cost 
of harvesting the fish . New Zealand fish could thereby be marketed on 
the basis of not only sustainable fishing, but also ocean-friendly fishing. 179 
This type of arrangement would at least partially address the criticisms of 
the QMS which are directed towards its species specific nature. 
VII OTHER 'RIGHTS' IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
A Overview 
Following is a synopsis of rights bases for non-commercial fisheries 
harvesting presented in a report to the NZ Seafood Industry Council Ltd 
(the report) .180 
178 Such an arrangement would provide a competitive edge for fishers desirous of 
using friendly methods. See description of the efforts of the Cape Cod 
Commercial Hook Fishermen's Association in Solutions to Seafloor Trawling 
<http://www.igc.apc.org/nrdc/nrdc/eamicus/97win/hisol.hunl> (last accessed 26 
July 1999). 
179 A similar strategy underpins our international marketing of non-genetically 
modified foods which is proving to be successful. See also Australia's Marine 
Stewardship Council which is an independent NGO established by WWF and 
Unilever which runs a voluntary sustainable fishery certification programme for 
fishers, processors and retailers, <http//www.msc.org> (last accessed 29 
September 1999). 
18° Clarke, above n 76, iv. 
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Marine aquaculture operates as sole owners or occupiers of small areas 
of the column of water granted under the Resource Management Act. 
Customary fisheries involve territorial user rights, being held by particular 
iwi occupying adjoining land and having rules developed by the owners 
and observed by them. 
Recreational marine fisheries operate as open access fisheries, subject to 
lightly enforced regulations, although research is currently being 
undertaken into a property rights regime for recreational fishers also.
181 
Non-use rights, which do not involve the extraction of fish, are currently 
imprecisely defined. 
A detailed examination of each of these areas in themselves is beyond the 
scope of this paper. The next section will concentrate on the interaction 
between commercial fishery users and what the report describes as "non-
users" . 
B "Non-use" Rights 
Non commercial stakeholders in the marine environment have for the 
most part been ignored by fisheries legislation. 
182 The first legislative 
recognition of such interests occurred recently. The relevant section 
provides for regulation for specific alternative T ACs not determined in 
accordance with MSY where "managing the stock at a level other than 
permitted under section 13 will have no detrimental effects on non-
commercial fishing interests in that stock". 
183 
181 "Stakeholder Management of Recreational Fisheries" Address by Minister of 
Fisheries to the Recreational Fishing Council AGM New Zealand Executive 
Government Speech Archive (18 July 1997) <http://www.executive.govt.nz1 
minister/luxton/jlsl807.htm> (last accessed 9 April 1999). 
182 For Parliamentary consideration see italacised text in passage from Hon Jim 
Sutton, (31 July 1996) NZPD 14034 above n 94. 
183 Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment 1999 s 14A(5)(c), emphasis added. 
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Although this represents an important step towards statutory recognition 
of non-commercial fishing interests, by limiting the interests to a 
particular QMS stock, it denies recognition of non-commercial interests 
in the wider marine environment. 
The report correctly identifies that non-use rights are imprecisely defined, 
but fails to even attempt to identify what "non-use" is or who "non-users" 
are. It seems to assume that "non-users" are conservationists and 
environmentalists. It provides an excuse for avoiding any definition on 
the grounds that there is no accepted definition of what non-use values 
may be. It is true that society's values change over time. But looking at 
non-use values from a uniquely conservation and environmental 
perspective is unduly limiting the definition before an attempt at a 
definition is even begun. 
The report's analysis of rights of stakeholders in the marine environment, 
in addition to dismissing without analysis the rights of environmentalists 
and conservationists, neglects to address rights of: 
(a) scientists and bioprospectors to maintain biological and genetic 
diversity; 
(b) sea vegetable harvesters to not be deprived of the resource from 
which they earn a living; 
( c) eco-tourism operators including dive shops and fishing charters; and 
( d) future generations to enjoy not only the fisheries resource, but the 
entire abundance of marine resources that we enjoy today. 
These· rights are "non-use" rights only with respect to the commercial 
fishery . They are part of a larger mix of extractive and non-extractive 
uses, uses which are as yet unknown and non-use values. 184 It is 
unrealistic not to factor these rights and interests into a report on 
184 See appendix 1. 
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fisheries management, when fisheries management legislation is the 
primary tool New Zealand uses to manage its oceans to the outer limits 
of the EEZ. These rights have either simply not been considered, or the 
authors of the report have bundled them into the non-use rights which 
they declined to define, and hence stymied debate on how to give effect 
to those rights. The reason given for not more precisely defining rights 
in respect of the marine environment was mainly that the costs of doing 
b hib. . Thi b iss so may e pro 1t1ve. s was ecause: 
D Fish move and, as such, do not lend themselves very well to definition within 
a confined area. 
D Rights to the marine environment and entitlements to fish within that 
environment could lead to a conflict of interests if they are not held by the 
same person. 
The first reason implies that in order to protect the marine environment, 
one would need to know exactly which fish were being caught where. If 
the aim is to protect rights to the marine environment as a whole, it does 
not matter where the fish are within the ocean. The fisher must respect 
the rights of "non-users" regardless of where the fish are. 
The second reason seems to be advocating that commercial fishing 
interests should be both judge and jury with respect to the manne 
environment, otherwise there would be a conflict of interest. It is that 
very "conflict" of interest between commercial fishers and non-users 
which, if permitted to take place on a level playing field, could play a 
fundamental role in protection of the marine environment. Rather than 
creating a "conflict" , acknowledging and according rights to various 
interests has the effect of creating a system of checks and balances. This 
is especially important in a free-market climate where the government has 
demonstrated a marked lack of political will to regulate to protect the 
rights of non-users absent "exceptional circumstances". 
185 Clarke, above n 76, 25. 
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Scientists and sea vegetable harvesters have rights to their resource via 
permit systems. 186 This permit does not confer a property right. If their 
interests were being seriously compromised by commercial fishing 
practices, it is likely that, after the matter was brought to the Minister of 
Fisheries' attention with sufficient persuasion, the Minister would 
intervene with regulation under section 297 or 298 of the 1996 Act. 
However regulation in response to such practices may well be too late if 
the area was particularly lucrative for trawlable commercial species. 
These "non-fisheries-user rights" would have vanished or been seriously 
compromised without compensation. This potential situation calls for a 
prevention mechanism. Under a regulatory model, that would involve 
regulation or prohibition of destructive fishing methods. Under the 
current market based property rights model, it involves the enforcement 
of environmental bottom lines to the effect that no interests in the marine 
environment are compromised by virtue of one set of interests being 
more entrenched than another. The sustainability provisions of the 1996 
Act would perhaps achieve this end if they were given some teeth. 
However as long as fishers feel free to ignore the provisions while 
exercising their rights in the most efficient manner they know how, we 
will not leave the road to the destruction of the marine environment. 
The rights of future generations are addressed in the section 8 purpose 
provision of the 1996 Act. As previously mentioned, this provision 
attempts to create two environmental bottom lines. The rights of future 
generations render pre-emptory enforcement of these environmental 
bottom lines crucial, as these stakeholders do not have the luxury of 
lobbying the Minister to regulate in the event their rights are 
compromised. It has been suggested that the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment could evolve into an environmental 
d. h . h . h 187 guar 1an to c amp1on t ese ng ts . Further, ensuring that 
contemporary communities feel that their interests are addressed, and 
186 Fisheries Act 1983 s 63 . 
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each person receives their 'ecological share' is likely to have positive flow 
on effects for inter-generational equity.
188 
It is also important that the precautionary principle be given its full effect 
with respect to these un-recognised stakeholders. Their potential to 
utilise and the way in which they value the oceans resources is possibly 
far greater than we can imagine. 
C The Imbalance 
According to a background paper to the Draft Biodiversity Strategy, 
189 
property rights regimes should determine not only the extent of exclusive 
benefits from having access to components of biodiversity, but also the 
duties or responsibilities that are associated with, and may constrain, this 
right of access. 
A key property rights issue is the extent to which the degree of 
exclusivity derived from having ownership of, or use rights to, 
components of biodiversity provides people with an incentive to use 
those components responsibly. In the context of this paper, does the 
degree of exclusivity derived from having ownership in the harvest of one 
or several commercial fish species under the QMS, provide fishers with 
an incentive to have regard to marine biodiversity in general? The 
answer, unfortunately, is that the QMS achieves this end in neither legal 
form nor underlying philosophy. 
The QMS does not adequately specify who has what rights in relation to 
the use and protection of genetic, species and ecosystem diversity. This 
specification should incorporate the notions of rights (to use) and duties 
(to protect). 
187 Richardson, above n 84, 126. 
188 Richardson, above n 84, 127. 
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Rights and duties for non-commercial fishing interests in the wider 
marine environment remain largely undefined. Definitional problems with 
respect to "non-use" right,s are real. But that does not constitute an 
' adequate reason to ignore :the existence of those rights. The result of 
ignoring those rights is that they are, and will continue to be, rendered 
secondary to the more precisely defined property rights in the harvest. 
For fishers, the QMS specifies rights with respect to target species. 
Fishers are bound by no duties beyond the duty not to take fish for which 
they have no quota and to comply with various regulations. 
Stewardship and environmental obligations are held by the Government 
under the 1996 Act. This stance in itself is commendable given that in 
many instances involving matters of public importance the benefits are 
diffuse, and no individual or company can benefit enough to make 
conservation and sustainable use through private ownership viable. 
Nonetheless it is the holders of ITQ who actually impact on the resource, 
and possess knowledge and control with respect to that impact. The 
entrenched nature of the ITQ property right coupled with industry's 
scientific capability to know in reality what effects they are having on the 
marine environment arguably creates a fiduciary duty towards holders of 
any other right in the marine environment. The possibility of a fiduciary 
duty arising from an imbalance of rights and knowledge highlights the 
need to impose stewardship and social obligations on holders of ITQ. 
The umbrella of stewardship and environmental obligations towards the 
marine environment ought to be expanded so that commercial fishers in 
the exercise of their rights must give effect to corresponding duties. It is 
unsatisfactory that these stakeholders are conferred only rights to harvest 
189 Property Rights Regimes and Indigenous Biodiversity (Draft, author unknown) 
background paper for Draft Biodiversity Strategy [Property Rights Regimes] . 
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unaccompanied by duties towards the environment from which they 
extract that harvest. 190 Better definition of duties owed by fishers 
towards other stakeholders in the marine environment is a simple and 
necessary step towards addressing the inadequacy of the definition of 
"non-use" rights in the marine environment. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
New Zealand's seafloor ecosystems comprise resources valued by a wide 
range of interests. The extent of their biological, species and genetic 
diversity is not yet understood. What is clear is that human kind's ability 
to fully utilise these resources has immense scope to be increased both in 
the current generation and in future generations. 
Commercial fishing impacts such as trawling, dredging and overfishing 
have adverse, and often irreversible effects on the marine environment. 
International legal obligations, notably that requmng an integrated 
ecosystem approach to fisheries, are not being given effect to within the 
domestic regime. 
New Zealand's approach to ecosystem management instead mostly stems 
from fisheries management in the form of the QMS. The sustainability 
provisions of the 1996 Act are not given adequate effect. The ideology 
underlying the Fisheries Act 1996 means that the market is the primary 
mechanism New Zealand has which addresses marine ecosystems. It is 
widely accepted that the market is an inappropriate forum in which to 
address the environmental effects of natural resource exploitation. In 
fisheries, the largest problem is the imbalance of rights between those 
190 An enforcement of the section 8 environmental bottom lines by way of 
mandatory environmental impact assessment would be one way in which such 
duties could be recognised. 
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with commercial fishery interests and other stakeholders in the marine 
environment. This imbalance effectively means commercial fishers are 
free to exercise their right while knowingly having an adverse impact on 
other stakeholders' interests in the marine environment. 
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Ministry of Fisheries' 
administration of the Act is subject to the powerful lobby of the vested 
interests of the commercial fishing industry. This explains the lack of 
political will in implementing the 1996 Act's sustainability provisions. In 
contrast, the lobby of other stakeholders in the marine environment such 
as environmentalists, conservationists, sea vegetable harvesters, eco-
tourism operators and scientists begins with less entrenched rights. 
Moreover, the target of this lobby is fragmented between the Ministry of 
Fisheries, the Department of Conservation and the Ministry for the 
Environment. 
Private property rights in the commercial harvest of fish must be clearly 
accompanied by environmental duties. These duties are essential to 
address the imbalance of rights between commercial fishers on the one 
hand; and other stakeholders in the wider marine environment whose 
interests are undoubtedly affected by the commercial fishery. 
Finally it is worth pondering the Ministry's Maori name, Te Tautiaki i nga 
tini a Tangaroa - the guardian of the multitudes of Tangaroa (god of the 
sea). 
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Source: Nicola Legat "Killing Seas: the Unseen Decimation ofour Ocean Ecosystems" (1997) 141 
North and South 100. 102. 
BELOW: 
A view of one of the heavily fished 
seamounts of Tasmania. The seabed is 
rock lightly dusted with sediment with a 
few isolated organisms. 
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LEFT: 
An unfished seamount 
1500m deep in the marine 
protected area off Australia's 
Tasmanian Coast. This highly 
diverse reef community 
consists of a base of 
colonial coral, 
Solenosmilia variabilis. 
A variety of soft corals, sponges 
and other organisms grow on 
top of this substrate. 
Other invertebrates such 
as sea urchins, crinoids 
(feather stars) and brittle 
stars which move.over the 
reef can also be seen. 
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APPENDIX3 
Convention on Biological Diversity 199 2 
Article 8 
(a) Establish a system of protected areas or areas where special measures need to be 
taken to conserve biological diversity: 
(b) Develop, where necessary, guidelines for the selection, establishment and management 
of protected areas or areas where special measures need to be taken to conserve 
biological diversity; 
(c) Regulate or manage biological resources important for the conservation of biological 
diversity ... with a view to ensuring their conservation and sustainable use; 
(d) Promote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable 
populations of species in natural surroundings; 
(e) Promote environmentally sound and sustainable development in areas adjacent to 
protected areas with a view to furthering protection of these areas; 
(!) Rehabilitate and restore degraded ecosystems and promote the recovery of threatened 
species; 
(g) Where a significant adverse effect on biological diversity has been determined 
pursuant to article 7; regulate or manage the relevant processes and categories of 
activities. 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1980) 
Article II 3: 
(a) Maintenance of the ecological relationships between harvested, dependant and 
related populations of Antarctic marine living resources and restoration of depleted 
populations to the levels [which ensure stable recruitment] 
(c) Prevention of changes or minimisation of risk or changes in marine ecosystems 
which are not potentially reversible over two or three decades, taking into account 
the state of available knowledge of the direct and indirect impact of harvesting, the 
effect of the introduction of alien species, the effects of associated activities on the 
marine ecosystem and of the effects of environmental changes, with the aim of 
making possible sustained conservation of Antarctic marine living resources 
Agenda21 
Chapter 17: 
J 7. 7 Coastal states ... should undertake measures to maintain biological diversity and 
productivity of marine species and habitats under national jurisdiction. Inter alia, these 
measures might include: .. . establishment and management of protected areas ... 
17.30 Taking action to ensure respect of areas designated within their EEZs consistent 
with international law, in order to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems such 
as coral reefs and mangroves. 
17. 75 States commit themselves to conservation and sustainable use of marine living 
resources under national jurisdiction. To this end, it is necessary to: 
(e) protect and restore endangered marine species; 
(!) preserve rare or fragile ecosystems, as well as habitats and other ecologically 
sensitive areas. 
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17.86 States should identify marine ecosystems exhibiting high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity and other critical habitat areas and provide necessary limitations 
on use in these areas, through, inter a/ia, designation of protected areas. 
FAO Precautionary Approach to Fisheries: Part 1 Guidelines on the Precautionary 
Approach to Capture Fisheries and Species Introductions June 1995. 
(a) Consideration of the needs of future generations and avoidance of changes that are not 
potentially reversible; 
(b) Prior identification of undesirable outcomes and of measures that will avoid them or 
correct them promptly; 
(c) That any necessary corrective measures are initiated without delay, and that they 
should achieve their purpose promptly, on a time scale not exceeding two or three 
decades; 
(d) That where the likely impact of resource use is uncertain, priority should be given to 
conserving the productive capacity of the resource; 
(e) That harvesting and processing capacity should be commensurate with estimated 
sustainable levels of resource, and that increases in capacity should be further 
constrained when resource productivity is uncertain; 
(/) All fishing activities must have prior management authorisation and be subject to 
periodic review; 
(g) An established legal and institutional framework for fishery management, within which 
fishery management plans that implement the above point should be instituted for each 
fishery; 
(h) Appropriate placement of the burden of proof by adhering to the requirements above. 
United Nations Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
Article 6.2 
States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The 
absence of adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for postponing or 
failing to take conservation and management measures. 
Article 6.3 provides that States shall: 
(a) improve decision-making for fishery resource conservation and management by obtaining 
and sharing the best scientific information available and implementing improved techniques 
for dealing with risk and uncertainty; 
(c) take into account, inter alia, uncertainties relating to the size and productivity of the stocks, 
reference points, stock condition in relation to such reference points, levels of distribution of 
fishing mortality and the impact of fishing activities on non-target and associated or 
dependant species, as well as existing and predicted oceanic, environmental and socio-
economic conditions; and 
(d) develop data collection and research programmes to assess the impact of fishing on non-
target and associated or dependant species and their environment, and adopt plans which 
are necessary to ensure the conservation of such species and to protect habitats of special 
concern. 
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1990/214 Fisheries (Reporting) Regulations 1990 
SECOND SCHEDULE-continued 
PART VI 
GEAR CODES 
Type of Trawl Net 
Bottom trawl 
Midwater trawl 
Bottom pair trawl 
Midwater pair trawl 
PART VII 
METHOD CODE 
Method , 
Purse seining 
Danish seining - single 
Danish seining · pair 
Lampara . . . . 
Beach seine drag netting 
Ring net · 
Handgathering 
Di. 
H_:1cillning 
Trolling 
Pole and line 
Bottom trawl - single 
Bottom. trawl - pair 
Midwater trawl - single 
Midwater trawl - pair 
Dredging . . . 
Cod potting 
Rock. lobster potting · 
Ed potting .. 
Fish traps 
Bottom longlining 
Surface longlining 
Drop/dahn lines 
Trot lines .. 
Set netting . . 
Inshore diiftnetting 
Fyke netting 
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Gear Code 
BT 
MW 
BPT 
MPT 
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Method Code-
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